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Showing posts with label subprime lending. Show all posts
Showing posts with label subprime lending. Show all posts

Thursday, September 25, 2008

Subprime Lending: Truthiness & Delusion of Mind


After Citigroup collapsed late last year, I wondered whether the underestimation of risk in securitized investments was the result of a failure in using scientific methods of risk assessment. Read my post dated Dec. 5, 2007. Soon, I learned that such methods were widely employed in investment banking and insurance. Apparently, misconception prevailed about the reliability of the predictions that these methods provide.

A year on, we find out that the statistical software did not fail. Any scientific method will provide a realistic prognosis only, if the entered data are correct. We presume that a loan is approved with the assurance that the applicant is going to be able to service the payments through the loan period, provided that the applicant's financial situation does not change dramatically. This good practice seemed to have been widely ignored in the subprime and prime ARM (adjustable rate mortgage) loan market of the past eight years. Too often, applicant naivety and lender carelessness took sway over prudence.

In hindsight, the considerate risk analyst would have welcomed an additional column in the input spreadsheet with a truthiness factor weighting each loan. That is, the loan agent is asked to assign a score estimating the applicant's ability to service the loan once the interest rate resets. The agent could be rewarded for good judgment and the improvement in the quality of loans issued. Perhaps such estimates from the field would have helped to predict the risks with the ensuing securities more accurately.

In the absence of such information, the analyst is left to look at the foreclosures on the loans to examine risk retrospectively in the hope that forward projections gain accuracy. Paul Jackson reports on housingwire.com in a post dated Sep. 5, 2008, that the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) announced in early September that more than 9 percent of U.S. mortgages were delinquent or in foreclosure at the end of the second quarter of this year. “Subprime ARM loans accounted for 36 percent of all foreclosures started and prime ARMs, which include option ARMs, represented 23 percent,” Jackson quotes MBA's chief economist Brinkmann.

Addenda

  • As The New York Times reports today, I am not far off with my assessment. Listen to this incredible story broadcast on National Public Radio's Morning Edition. What were the banks thinking (11/05/08)?
  • Today, Lynn Adler reports on Reuters that according to a recent Mortgage Bankers Association assessment roughly 13 percent of U.S. households were three months late with mortgage payments or in foreclosure at the end of 2008 (03/05/09).
  • As Michael Osinski, one-time author of bundling and valuation software for mortgages, suggests in this segment broadcast today on National Public Radio's All Things Considered, his programs would have benefited greatly from an entry for the probability with which a borrower was actually able to realize the estimated value of the real estate borrowed against (04/05/09).
  • The current financial crisis began with an extravagant real estate boom that nobody could afford and will end, once the last foreclosed properties are sold. Read David Leonhardt's report in The New York Times, published yesterday.  I reckon that we shall reach the turning point no sooner than 2011 (04/22/09).
  • Lynn Adler reports in a post on Reuters today that foreclosures have by far not peaked out yet according to an analysis by RealtyTrac.com (05/13/09).
  • If you like to find out how many years it will take to recover a loss in home value, you may wish to use the calculator here (05/21/09).
  • According to Nouriel Roubini's assessment of the economic outlook in an interview with Reuters yesterday, my prediction of recovery perhaps in 2011 may not be far off the mark (06/17/09). Watch below:


  • According to Ilaina Jonas' analysis on Reuters today, commercial mortgage holders are also finding it increasingly more difficult to refinance. About 4.5 percent of commercial loans are a month or more in delinquency, compared with 1.2 percent in 2007. Commercial real estate has lost a third in value since. Many borrowers cannot obtain the funding they need. In contrast to residential mortgages, however, lenders are more willing to extend these loans in the hope that the borrowers will regain sufficient liquidity soon (07/23/09).
  • In her post on Reuters today, Lynn Adler reports that according to the latest assessment of RealtyTrac foreclosures reached a new peak with 360,000 filings nationwide in July. Further increases are expected in coming months, when state legislature-instituted moratoria expire. The recession may have bottomed out. But, recovery has not yet begun (08/13/09).
  • According to The Economist's daily chart post dated Aug. 21, 2009, one in four home sales at present results from repossession (08/29/09).
  • Among the bank CEOs who have been testifying before Congress to illuminate the causes of the finnacial crisis, the mortgage brokers seem the most defiant and delusional, denying any failure of risk assessment in their actions during the housing bubble. National Public Radio's news staff published an informative article with the title "Ex-Washington Mutual CEO Criticizes Bank's Seizure" on today's testimony of former Washington Mutual CEO Kerry Killinger before Congress. The text of Killinger's testimony can be downloaded on the Wall Street Journal's site. You may wish to listen to the podcast with his pronouncements entitled "WAMU CEO Defends Bank at Senate Hearing" on Nation Public Radio's All Things Considered (04/13/10).
  • According to Gretchen Morgensons report with the title "How Countrywide Covered the Cracks" published online in The New York Times yesterday, the head of Countrywide Financial Corp. and co-founder of the company Angelo R. Mozilo anticipated in 2005 that the company's aggressive promotion of adjustable-rate mortgages (A.R.M.s), particularly subprime mortgages and pay-option A.R.M.s, would spell disaster, when the housing market slowed and the interest rates reset. Pay-options allowed the borrowers to pay less than the stipulated monthly installments, while their payments were applied only to the interest and the unpaid remainder was added to the mortgage, substantially increasing the mortgaged amount. Already in 2004, adjustable-rate mortgages comprised roughly half of Countrywide's loans and pay-option A.R.M. a quarter. Mr. Mozilo warned of the risk these loans posed to the company in internal communications, but portrayed an upbeat and overtly optimistic picture on the outside. He was also concerned about loans that allowed borrowers to purchase homes without down payments. Despite, his company continued to push these products unrelentingly. Countrywide was sold at bargain price to Bank of America in 2008. Because he continuously had sold his stocks in the company up to that point, without sharing his concerns with investors, he agreed last week in a settlement with the Securities and Exchange Commission to pay 67.5 million dollars as penalty and reparations to investors (10/17/10).
  • Jason Zweig posted an informative article entitled "The Man Who Called the Financial Crisis-70 Years Early" with The Wall Street Journal today. The article tells the story of the Hungarian economist Melchior Palyi (1892-1970) who foresaw in the 1930s that many measures the U.S. government implemented to stabilize the economy after Black Tuesday, 1929, would lead to another financial crisis fueled by wide-spread defaults on mortgages (11/06/10).
  • After a month-long hiatus, Bank of America resumes foreclosures on 16,000 residential properties (12/10/10):
  • According to Corbett Daly's report with the title "U.S. single-family home prices fell for a fifth straight month in November and could plumb new lows soon, a closely watched survey showed on Tuesday" posted online on Reuters today, the seasonally-adjusted Standard & Poor's/Case-Shiller composite index of home prices in 20 metropolitan areas fell 0.5 percent in November from October. The finding suggests that the housing market has yet to recover and we may be headed for a second dip before Spring (01/25/11).
  • I was hoping that the housing crisis would be over by now. But robo-signing, bungles in bank record keeping and the ensuing law suits slowed foreclosures down, impeding recovery of the housing market. In this interview with The Wall Street Journal published yesterday, Nouriel Roubini provides informative insights on the current economic outlook (08/12/2011):



Wednesday, December 5, 2007

About Taking Risks



The Eidgenoessische Technische Hochschule (ETH) in Zurich, Switzerland, is an astounding institution of higher learning. Literally, the name translates into English as “Federal Technical High School”. "Federal", because the Swiss federal government supports the institution. "Confederal" would be more appropriate, because the Swiss define their nation as the Confederation of the Swiss. The acronym on their trunk stickers reads CH for confederatio helvetiae, which means Confederation of the Swiss in Latin. Latin was the language of the learned when the Swiss founded their Confederation more than 700 years ago with an oath sworn to help each other. “Eidgenossenschaft”, the German term for the Confederation, means comradeship by oath. The ETH is not a High School. That would be a “Gymnasium” in the Teutonic Languages. It is an engineering school. I use statistical analyses frequently. The ETH helps to develop R, which is one of the most powerful and versatile statistics packages available in open source computing.

In the year 2000, the ETH launched a research initiative in risk assessment. When I heard of this idea, I thought: ”Typically Swiss! They always worry about insurance.” When I checked, most projects aimed at assessing risks in civil engineering and catastrophic damage. But, I bet the principles guiding the software find ready application in the assessment of other types of risk. Just a few weeks ago CEO Charles Prince resigned, because his bank had incurred tantamount losses while dabbling in high-risk investments in sub-prime lending (Dan Wilchins and Jonathan Stempel's post on Reuters dated Nov. 2, 2007, with the title "Citigroup CEO Prince to resign: reports"). What did he blame? Faulty software that was making bad predictions on risk! In his testimony before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,  Mar. 7, 2008, he blames the models the industry was using. Perhaps, he should have consulted with the ETH, before he decided to go down that road.

Addenda

  • In hindsight, the bank managers heavily relied on these tools in their decisions. However, even at UBS they did not comprehend them well enough to interpret the data correctly (08/01/2008).
  • At yesterday's congressional hearing, Citigroup's former CEO Charles Prince apologized to Americans hurt by the financial crisis that Citigroup helped precipitate in no small part. He believes that risk reporting within the institution at the time was not at fault and followed good practices. Rather, faulty risk assessment caused the bank's enormous losses. He had come to this conclusion already three years ago (see above). However, now responsibility is shifted to the originators of the bad loans. Prince seems to believe that Citigroup was misled by the original lenders' overoptimistic judgment of the customers' ability to service subprime mortgages. As a result, the risk attached to the securitized bundles containing these loans was understimated and the price at which they were sold to investors was overrated. Listen closely (04/09/10)!
  • Contrary to the former CEOs of Lehman Brothers, Citigroup and Washington Mutual, some in the industry understood the risk attached to subprime lending extremely well.

    On Apr. 22, 2010, Carrick Mollenkamp, Mark Whitehouse and Anton Troianovski published an informative chronicle in The Wall Street Journal entitled "The Busted Homes Behind a Big Bet" of the events surrounding a collateralized debt obligation, or CDO for short, named Abacus that achieved notoriety lately as an example for the catastrophic failure of securitized mortgage bundles that precipitated this country's greatest economic crisis since the Great Depression while providing its creators with extraordinary returns.

    In 2007, Paulson & Co., a hedge-fund management company, helped create Abacus 2007-AC1 for institutional investors in collaboration with Goldman Sachs and the portfolio selection-agent ACA Management, LLC. Within the next six months, Abacus would lose 83 percent of its value.

    Paulson & Co. had painstakingly analyzed the mortgages bundled in Abacus and correctly predicted that great losses were inevitable and soon to come. A senior employee of the firm, Paolo Pellegrini, was deeply involved in structuring Abacus. According the Wall Street Journal article, " Mr. Pellegrini and a colleague had purchased an enormous database capable of tracking the characteristics of more than six million mortgages in various parts of the country. They spent long hours scouring it all, according to people familiar with the matter." Paulson and Co. took out insurance against the CDO's demise, cashing out a billion dollars at its end.

    Apparently, correct models for risk assessment and data bases with the necessary information were available to those who wished to come to the right conclusions (04/25/10).
  • This Reuters video report by Bobbi Rebell with the title "Camping out for a change" published today portrays a new political movement that attempts to harness people's feared risk of being set adrift by those with a seemingly insatiable appetite for it. Within the past decade, risk assessment has become the overarching theme of our time (10/10/2011).
    (Thumbnail photo by Lucy Nicholson, Reuters)

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